[et_pb_section fullwidth=”on” specialty=”off” background_image=”https:\/\/rhodeisland.concon.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/03\/Rhode-Island-Legislature.jpg” background_color=”#ffffff” inner_shadow=”off” parallax=”on” parallax_method=”css”][et_pb_fullwidth_header admin_label=”Fullwidth Sitewide Header” title=”Rhode Island’s Nov. 2014 Referendum to Call a Constitutional Convention” subhead=”An Information Clearinghouse” background_layout=”dark” text_orientation=”center” \/][\/et_pb_section][et_pb_section][et_pb_row][et_pb_column type=”1_4″][et_pb_divider admin_label=”Divider” color=”#ffffff” show_divider=”off” \/][\/et_pb_column][et_pb_column type=”1_2″][et_pb_text admin_label=”Text” background_layout=”light” text_orientation=”left”]<\/p>\n
The\u00a0democratic function of a\u00a0periodic constitutional convention is to propose solutions to\u00a0problems that Rhode Island’s General Assembly won’t address because it is the problem.<\/p>\n
The American system of government\u00a0is based on the separation of powers among various government agents. \u00a0These agents include the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government; and local, state, and national governments. \u00a0In this system, American state legislatures are not entrusted with exclusive power over constitutional reform.\u00a0 The sovereign (popularly known as \u201cthe people\u201d)\u00a0are provided with some way to ratify legislatively initiated constitutional amendments.\u00a0 They also retain an inalienable right to change their constitution in the face of a recalcitrant legislature.\u00a0\u00a0 But what that right of reform means has generally been left vague.\u00a0 In early state constitutions, it often implied the violent overthrow of the government, as was done in the U.S. Revolutionary War at the late 18th Century and Rhode Island\u2019s\u00a0Dorr Rebellion in the early 1840s.<\/p>\n
The democratic function of a periodic constitutional convention referendum is to implement this inalienable right in a peaceful way.\u00a0 Specifically, it is a check on the \u201cgatekeeping power\u201d of a state legislature over constitutional reform.\u00a0 When a state legislature controls\u00a0what constitutional reforms the public is allowed to vote on, it has gatekeeping power over constitutional reform.\u00a0 This is inconsistent with the fundamental principle of constitutional democracy that the citizenry should have the right to reform their state constitution when they so choose. \u00a0The role of the periodic constitutional convention as a check on the legislature makes\u00a0it an inherently unpopular institution with legislatures.<\/p>\n
In early 18th<\/sup> century American colonies, provincial governors had similar gatekeeping power over most colonial legislatures.\u00a0 A governor could convene a legislature whenever he wanted and prevent its convening when he thought it might act adverse to his interests.\u00a0 The resulting abuses led to the widespread demand for periodic legislatures, an essential\u00a0democratic right\u00a0all Americans today take for granted but that wasn\u2019t guaranteed until after the American Revolutionary War.<\/p>\n Partly in response to Rhode Island\u2019s Dorr Rebellion in the early 1840s, states such as New York (1846), Michigan (1850), Maryland (1851), Ohio (1851), and Iowa (1857) added periodic constitutional convention referendums to their constitutions.\u00a0 Having learned from Rhode Island\u2019s experience with violent constitutional change in response to a recalcitrant legislature, they wanted to develop a peaceful means to achieve the same end.\u00a0 By the end of the 19th<\/sup> century, six states had such provisions.\u00a0 By the end of the 20th<\/sup>, fourteen had them, including Rhode Island as of 1973.<\/p>\n Most of the 20th<\/sup> century provisions were created in the wake of a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the early 1960s, which forced many states, including Rhode Island, to reapportion their legislatures based on the principle of one-person, one-vote. \u00a0 The Court decisions led to a wave of constitutional conventions.<\/p>\n Constitutional conventions vary in democratic function and type, so it is important to distinguish between the\u00a0periodic constitutional convention referendum and\u00a0other types of constitutional convention.<\/p>\n The legislatively initiated and controlled \u201climited\u201d constitutional convention\u201d is diametrically opposed to the periodic constitutional convention referendum because it\u00a0preserves 100% of the legislature\u2019s gatekeeping powers over constitutional reform. \u00a0The \u201climited\u201d constitutional convention was especially popular in Rhode Island through the middle 20th<\/sup> century.<\/p>\n A better terminology to distinguish a \u201climited\u201d from an \u201cunlimited\u201d constitutional convention would be a \u201cdependent\u201d versus an \u201cindependent\u201d constitutional convention. \u00a0In a dependent constitutional convention, the legislature has formal \u00a0control over\u00a0the\u00a0agenda, whereas it has no such control in an independent constitutional convention.<\/p>\n It is also important to note that\u00a0a constitutional convention may not be limited to overcoming\u00a0the legislature\u2019s gatekeeping powers over constitutional reform.\u00a0 For example, during the late 18th<\/sup>century, a constitutional convention was often the only way to change a state constitution. \u00a0As late as the mid-20th<\/sup>century, it remained the only method of constitutional change in New Hampshire. \u00a0It also remains the best\u2014if rarely needed\u2014mechanism to make substantial constitutional revisions. \u00a0However, the unique\u00a0democratic function of\u00a0the periodic constitutional convention is that it overcomes the legislature\u2019s gatekeeping power over constitutional reform. (The legislature\u2019s gatekeeping power may also be overcome via the constitutional initiative, but that is a fundamentally different type of institution that lacks the deliberative qualities of a constitutional convention and is not, in any case, available in Rhode Island.)<\/p>\n There is wide variance in the quality of constitutionally mandated periodic constitutional convention referendums.\u00a0 Those drafted during the 19th<\/sup> century tend to be under specified, leaving too much room for legislatures to manipulate them.\u00a0 Those drafted or reformed in the latter half of the 20th<\/sup> century mitigate some notable flaws in the early provisions.<\/p>\n For example, Rhode Island\u2019s provision creates a safety valve to ensure that the mandated periodic referendum actually gets placed on the ballot.\u00a0 If the General Assembly refuses to do so, the Secretary of State is tasked with doing so.\u00a0 This lessens the risk that, as in Oklahoma since 1970, the legislature will simply refuse to place the constitutionally mandated referendum on the ballot.<\/p>\n Still, there is great room for improving the periodic constitutional convention referendum.\u00a0 Too often, as with the U.S. constitutional convention of 1787 that drafted Article V\u2019s extraordinarily ambiguous\u00a0constitutional convention provision, both citizens and framers treat constitutional convention provisions as an afterthought.\u00a0 It is critical that provisions be included to ensure the constitutional convention\u2019s independence and democratic legitimacy.\u00a0 To the extent that such provisions are missing, a periodic constitutional convention referendum loses its democratic function.<\/p>\n For additional information on the periodic state constitutional convention referendum, see the FAQ<\/a> on this website and The State Constitutional Convention Clearinghouse<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n [\/et_pb_text][\/et_pb_column][et_pb_column type=”1_4″][et_pb_social_media_follow admin_label=”Social Media Follow” link_shape=”rounded_rectangle” background_layout=”light” url_new_window=”on” follow_button=”on”][et_pb_social_media_follow_network social_network=”twitter” url=”https:\/\/twitter.com\/4Nov14ConConRI” bg_color=”#00aced”]Twitter[\/et_pb_social_media_follow_network][\/et_pb_social_media_follow][et_pb_divider admin_label=”Divider” color=”#ffffff” show_divider=”off” height=”80″ \/][et_pb_testimonial admin_label=”Testimonial” url_new_window=”off” quote_icon=”on” use_background_color=”on” background_color=”#f5f5f5″ background_layout=”light” text_orientation=”left”]<\/p>\n In a multistage collective-choice process, an early-acting individual or group of individuals is said to possess a gatekeeping right<\/em> if the governing procedures of the body allow the individual or group not to act on specific proposals, and if the certain consequence of such inaction is that an exogenously determined status quo policy remains in effect…. \u00a0In contrast, a body or group is said to have gatekeeping power<\/em> if it has a gatekeeping right and the right produces an outcome that the gatekeeper prefers to the outcome that would have resulted if it did not have a gatekeeping right.<\/p>\nSource: “Gatekeeping,” Journal of Politics<\/em>, 2006<\/address>\n [\/et_pb_testimonial][\/et_pb_column][\/et_pb_row][\/et_pb_section]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The Dependent Vs. Independent Constitutional Convention<\/h4>\n
Variation Across States<\/h4>\n
Definition of Gatekeeping Right &\u00a0Power<\/h3>\n