[et_pb_section fullwidth=”on” specialty=”off” background_image=”https:\/\/rhodeisland.concon.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/03\/Rhode-Island-Legislature.jpg” background_color=”#ffffff” inner_shadow=”off” parallax=”on” parallax_method=”css”][et_pb_fullwidth_header admin_label=”Fullwidth Sitewide Header” title=”Rhode Island’s Nov. 2014 Referendum to Call a Constitutional Convention” subhead=”An Information Clearinghouse” background_layout=”dark” text_orientation=”center” \/][\/et_pb_section][et_pb_section background_color=”#f3ffc1″ inner_shadow=”off” parallax=”off” parallax_method=”css”][et_pb_row][et_pb_column type=”4_4″][et_pb_text admin_label=”Text” background_layout=”light” text_orientation=”center”]<\/p>\n
Instructions: Click on the plus sign on the right of each question to see the answer.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n [\/et_pb_text][et_pb_toggle admin_label=”Toggle What is the November 4, 2014 Constitutional Convention Referendum Question?” title=”What is the November 4, 2014 Constitutional Convention Referendum Question? ” open=”off”]<\/p>\n On the ballot, Rhode Islander voters will be asked: “Shall there be a convention to amend or revise the constitution?\u201d<\/p>\n [\/et_pb_toggle][et_pb_toggle admin_label=”Toggle What is a constitutional convention?” title=”What is a constitutional convention?” open=”off”]<\/p>\n A constitutional convention is a one-time gathering of elected delegates who can propose amendments to Rhode Island Constitution. Rhode Island’s Constitution requires that every ten years Rhode Islanders be asked whether they would like to hold a constitutional convention. Rhode Island is one of fourteen states with such a periodic referendum.<\/p>\n [\/et_pb_toggle][et_pb_toggle admin_label=”Toggle When did Rhode Island last convene a constitutional convention?” title=”When did Rhode Island last convene a constitutional convention?” open=”off”]<\/p>\n Rhode Island’s last constitutional convention took place in 1985-1986. American states have held more than 230 state constitutional conventions since 1776. \u00a0In contrast, the Federal government has only held one constitutional convention–in 1787.<\/p>\n [\/et_pb_toggle][et_pb_toggle admin_label=”Toggle What is the democratic function of a state constitutional convention? ” title=”What is the democratic function of a state constitutional convention? ” open=”off”]<\/p>\n From the Revolutionary Era through the mid-19th century, the state constitutional convention was the primary method of constitutional change in American states. Gradually, this was replaced by a system that bypassed a constitutional convention and gave the legislature complete control over the change agenda. \u00a0The primary remaining democratic function of the state constitutional convention is to propose democratic reforms where the legislature has a blatant conflict of interest with the public. \u00a0The state constitutional convention also remains well suited for proposing major constitutional revisions, even if those revisions are only organizational and stylistic. But as state democracies have matured, the need for general revision has become less important.<\/p>\n [\/et_pb_toggle][et_pb_toggle admin_label=”Toggle What happens if the voters approve a constitutional convention on November 4, 2014?” title=”What happens if the voters approve a constitutional convention on November 4, 2014?” open=”off”]<\/p>\n In 2015, there will be a special election to choose 75 delegates, one for each Rhode Island House district.<\/p>\n The delegates will meet in the State House to debate democratic reforms. \u00a0Those they endorse by majority vote will appear as a referendum question on the statewide ballot.<\/p>\n At the next general election, voters will have a chance to approve or reject each of the constitutional convention’s various proposed constitutional amendments.<\/p>\n [\/et_pb_toggle][et_pb_toggle admin_label=”Toggle How does the people’s role differ in the constitutional convention and legislative processes? ” title=”How does the people’s role differ in the constitutional convention and legislative processes? ” open=”off”]<\/p>\n The constitutional convention process creates constitutional (organic) law, which must be approved by the sovereign (the people).<\/p>\n In contrast, the legislative process creates statutory law, which may be approved by the sovereign’s government agents (the legislature).<\/p>\n With the constitutional convention process, the sovereign is automatically granted three votes before there is a change in law: 1) to choose whether to convene a constitutional convention, 2) to choose representatives to a constitutional convention, and 3) to choose whether to approve the constitutional convention’s proposed reforms.<\/p>\n In contrast, the legislative process may only grant the sovereign one vote before there is a change in law: to choose representatives to the legislative and executive branches of government. \u00a0These representatives have the power to not only propose but approve changes in law.<\/p>\n [\/et_pb_toggle][et_pb_toggle admin_label=”Toggle How does the transparency of the constitutional convention and legislative process differ? ” title=”How does the transparency of the constitutional convention and legislative process differ? ” open=”off”]<\/p>\n The legislative process<\/a> often allows unpopular issues to be inserted in proposed laws at the last minute and passed into law without the scrutiny of \u00a0fellow lawmakers, the press, and the public. \u00a0With a constitutional convention, proposed laws are published months before they can be passed into law.<\/p>\n The legislative agenda is huge, usually including thousands of proposed laws on widely varying subjects, of which legislators rarely read and understand more than small fraction. \u00a0With a constitutional convention, the agenda is relatively narrow and delegates usually read and try to understand all the proposed laws.<\/p>\n With the legislative process, few proposed laws are extensively debated in public, debated with diverse points of view, and debated on the public record in a modern, accessible format (e.g., webcast). \u00a0With a constitutional convention, it is expected that the great majority of proposals are extensively debated in public and in a modern, accessible format. \u00a0This debate occurs before the delegates vote on the proposals. \u00a0Then the public is expected to repeat the process before it decides whether to ratify the convention’s proposals.<\/p>\n As the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives said about the Affordable Care Act, one of the longest (more than 1,000 pages) and most important pieces of legislation of the last decade, “We have to pass the bill so you can find out what is in it.” \u00a0This could never happen with the proposals of a state constitutional convention. \u00a0The public would have months to review a final proposal before being asked to enact it into law.<\/p>\n [\/et_pb_toggle][et_pb_toggle admin_label=”Toggle Are constitutional conventions likely to do more harm than legislatures? ” title=”Are constitutional conventions likely to do more harm than legislatures? ” open=”off”]<\/p>\n Changing state organic law can potentially do more harm than changing state statutory law, largely because such changes are harder to reverse. That is one reason that the constitutional convention process has so many additional safeguards built into it, including requirements for much greater deliberation and transparency. Those additional safeguards are a primary reason that powerful special interests,which prefer to operate swiftly and in the dark, have come to strongly oppose constitutional conventions. \u00a0In any case, the Federal Constitution, including its Bill of Rights, always trumps state constitutions.<\/p>\n [\/et_pb_toggle][et_pb_toggle admin_label=”Toggle Are constitutional conventions likely to violate the interests of minorities? ” title=”Are constitutional conventions likely to violate the interests of minorities? ” open=”off”]<\/p>\n Constitutional conventions in Rhode Island and in the great majority of U.S. states are a type of majoritarian institution. \u00a0That is, they don’t give minorities a veto power on their proposals. \u00a0But the vast majority of Americans support strong civil and political rights for minorities, such as those incorporated in the Federal Constitution’s Bill of Rights and those already incorporated in Rhode Island’s Constitution. \u00a0The real issue is usually whether past or present majorities should be given control over the scope of civil and political rights. \u00a0If you think that past generations were smarter and more moral than we are, then you might prefer giving past majorities such control.<\/p>\n State constitutions don’t protect minorities; they protect the status quo. \u00a0That is, they protect current minorities that were formerly majorities. \u00a0It is hard to justify on democratic grounds why some minorities but not others should be privileged merely because they once had a majority.<\/p>\n In contrast to most U.S. states, the Federal Constitution requires a supermajority of states for constitutional change. \u00a0But within each state, the vote is a simple majority. \u00a0Given the vast difference in population of U.S. states (e.g., compare the population of California vs. Wyoming), it’s actually possible that a minority of the people (acting directly or via their representatives) can pass constitutional amendments even though a supermajority of states is required for passage. \u00a0The Federal Constitution thus tends to protect only one type of minority: citizens from small states whose votes on constitutional change may be worth more than fifty times as much as a citizen from a large state.<\/p>\n [\/et_pb_toggle][et_pb_toggle admin_label=”Toggle Can the public be trusted to do what is in its own interest?” title=”Can the public be trusted to do what is in its own interest?” open=”off”]<\/p>\n This is arguably the most important issue for you to answer in deciding whether to support the constitutional convention process. \u00a0For thousands of years, the vast majority of opinion leaders argued that the general public was incapable of exercising power in its own interest. \u00a0These leaders included kings and those who depended on the king’s favor. \u00a0And since there were few if any contemporary democracies to point to, especially large scale democracies, the debate was largely theoretical.<\/p>\n The current debate over state constitutional conventions is often conducted in a similar factual vacuum, only the distrust of the public is no longer openly acknowledged, instead being expressed indirectly, often in code words. \u00a0The most common way opponents of constitutional conventions do this is by speaking as if the public doesn’t have the right to reject any and all constitutional convention proposals. \u00a0Instead, they imply that a constitutional convention has the power to not only propose constitutional amendments but to ratify them. \u00a0 Since the public is generally clueless about how a constitutional convention works (e.g., assuming it has similar powers to a legislature), this can be a very effective strategy.<\/p>\n You may want to consult the history of Rhode Island’s earlier constitutional conventions to come to your own judgment. \u00a0You may find that rather than being wild yahoos, the general public tends to be highly conservative about any major proposed constitutional changes.<\/p>\n [\/et_pb_toggle][et_pb_toggle admin_label=”Toggle How much would a constitutional convention cost?” title=”How much would a constitutional convention cost?” open=”off”]<\/p>\n The cost of Rhode Island’s last state constitutional convention in 1984-6 was $891,000. \u00a0In 2014 inflation adjusted dollars, that comes to\u00a0$1,920,960. \u00a0Rhode Island’s FY2014 budget<\/a> was \u00a0$8,379,400,000. \u00a0In other words, every day Rhode Island’s State government spends $22,957,260 and every hour $956,552, which suggests that a state constitutional convention would cost about 2 hours of Rhode Island’s annual budget. \u00a0If local government expenditures were added into the mix (state constitutions create a framework for\u00a0both state and local government), the cost would be about\u00a0an hour.<\/p>\n If the recommendations of a state constitutional convention increased the efficiency of state government spending by only 1% over a year, the return on investment for Rhode Island citizens would be 436:1. \u00a0If the 1% savings are projected out\u00a0thirty\u00a0years (it is thirty years since Rhode Island’s last constitutional convention and there could be a similar delay in the future), the return on investment for Rhode Island citizens would be 13,806:1 (436\/year X 30 years). \u00a0If local government budgets were added into the mix, the number would be proportionately larger.<\/p>\n Of course, those that\u00a0believe that a constitutional convention would likely weaken\u00a0the efficiency and effectiveness of state and local government, would derive a very different estimate of the returns from this type of investment in strengthening democratic institutions.<\/p>\n