{"id":2596,"date":"2024-10-17T13:12:15","date_gmt":"2024-10-17T17:12:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rhodeisland.concon.info\/?p=2596"},"modified":"2024-11-06T19:42:17","modified_gmt":"2024-11-07T00:42:17","slug":"following-the-money-on-question-1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rhodeisland.concon.info\/?p=2596","title":{"rendered":"Following the money on Question 1"},"content":{"rendered":"[et_pb_section admin_label=”section”]\n\t\t\t[et_pb_row admin_label=”row”]\n\t\t\t\t[et_pb_column type=”4_4″][et_pb_text admin_label=”Text”]\n

Constitutional convention opponents warn of out-of-state money pouring into Rhode Island. But look who the biggest spenders really are leading up to Election Day.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Who are the major funders of state constitutional convention referendums? The leaders of Rhode Island\u2019s coalition opposing a convention, RI Citizens for Responsible Government<\/a>, report that \u201cwealthy special interests,\u201d including \u201cout-of-state\u201d and \u201cdark money\u201d interests, support convention referendums. However, the evidence shows the opposite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rhode Island\u2019s \u201cno\u201d coalition does make some valid general observations about funding for ballot measures: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

1) The wealthy can spend unlimited amounts of money on referendums (but they have been allowed to since 1978, not 2010, as the \u201cno\u201d coalition claims.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2) Large amounts of money have been spent trying to influence referendums.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3) Money can influence referendum results.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But when the coalition compares \u201cno\u201d and \u201cyes\u201d campaigns, it gets its facts backward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cNo\u201d campaigns far outspend \u201cyes\u201d campaigns. In fact, \u201cno\u201d campaigns are backed by the most powerful special interest groups in each state. And \u201cno\u201d campaigns are also backed by out-of-state interests \u2014 mostly national organizations supporting their state affiliates. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Consider Alaska in 2022<\/a>, the last election cycle with a convention referendum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u201cno\u201d side raised $4.8 million, the \u201cyes\u201d side $61,600, for a 78:1 advantage for the \u201cyes\u201d side. Since political science demonstrates that a ballot measure campaign dollar spent defending the status quo is much more effective than one spent proposing change, the 78:1 nominal advantage greatly underestimates the effective advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On a per capita basis, the \u201cno\u201d campaign was the most expensive \u201cno\u201d campaign among all the 140 ballot measures across the U.S. On a per capita basis, it also had the largest amount of out-of-state and dark money.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a>
 What Question 1 will look like on the Nov. 5, 2024, ballot. (Rhode Island Secretary of State Voter Guide)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The combined out-of-state and dark money represented 67.4% of the total \u201cno\u201d spending and all came from the D.C.-based Sixteen Thirty Fund<\/a>, which is run by a former National Education Association political operative<\/a>. The in-state money predominantly came from local unions, especially unions representing government employees. For the \u201cyes\u201d campaign, the money predominantly came from individuals, with the largest \u201cyes\u201d contribution ($10,000) only 0.002 times the size of the largest \u201cno\u201d contribution ($3.2 million). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Rhode Island in 2014, the last time the convention referendum was on the ballot, the \u201cno\u201d side contributed $151,800 and the \u201cyes\u201d side $41,500, a 3.7 advantage. As in Alaska, the predominant \u201cno\u201d funders and organizers were unions and the predominant \u201cyes\u201d funders were individuals. Rhode Island hasn\u2019t had an Alaska-style dark money problem; it has primarily had a disclosure enforcement problem<\/a> \u2014 a campaign finance system that favors the wealthy and powerful over everyone else who, for example, cannot afford the high legal costs required to enforce the law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As of Oct. 16, 2024, the \u201cno\u201d coalition had raised $119,700 for campaign advertising, including $15,000<\/a> from the out-of-state National Education Association, according to campaign finance reports filed with the Rhode Island Board of Elections. No \u201cyes\u201d campaign currently exists. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A major difference between the \u201cno\u201d and \u201cyes\u201d sides concerns the leadup to a referendum when polls indicate the \u201cyes\u201d side might win. Here the \u201cno\u201d side seems to be able to spend whatever it takes to secure a win whereas the \u201cyes\u201d side cannot. This may be because unions, such as the National Education Association, keep a large fund to provide its local affiliates with support in such a situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cNo\u201d campaigns far outspend \u201cyes\u201d campaigns. In fact, \u201cno\u2019 campaigns are backed by the most powerful special interest groups in each state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What explains the imbalance in campaign finance between the \u201cyes\u201d and \u201cno\u201d campaigns? One explanation involves the democratic function of the convention process, which, like the ballot initiative (which Rhode Island lacks), is to bypass the legislature\u2019s monopoly gatekeeping power. This makes not only legislatures but the special interest groups that excel at influencing legislatures into the natural enemies of the convention process. A second explanation is that improving government infrastructure \u2014 the core function of the convention process \u2014 is a quintessentially public good, so suffers from severe collective action problems. An analogy is the different collective action problems faced by producers (e.g., airlines) vs. consumers (e.g., passengers); the former are well organized and funded, the latter not so. Similarly, \u201cno\u201d sides are better funded and organized than \u201cyes\u201d sides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From the late 19th to early 20th centuries, big business primarily organized \u201cno\u201d campaigns. Beginning in the late 20th century, it became big labor. Big business still plays a major role opposing conventions in Republican states; much less so in Democratic ones such as Rhode Island.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To really understand who would benefit from a convention, look no farther than who funds and orchestrates \u2018no\u201d campaigns. Claims inconsistent with this funding data are Machiavellian politics. After the 2004 referendum, the Providence Journal\u2019s editorial page editor Edward Achorn convincingly argued<\/a> the \u201cno\u201d campaign not only successfully hid its funding but did so because timely revealing it could have caused it to lose the close election<\/a>. His insights are as relevant today as they were then.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

#<\/p>\n\n\n\n

J.H. Snider is the editor of The Rhode Island State Constitutional Convention Clearinghouse and author of the video, “Question 1 \u2013 Constitutional Convention.”<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Source: <\/strong>Snider,\u00a0 J.H.,\u00a0Following the money on Question 1<\/a>, Rhode Island Current, Oct. 17, 2024.<\/p>\n[\/et_pb_text][\/et_pb_column]\n\t\t\t[\/et_pb_row]\n\t\t[\/et_pb_section]","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Constitutional convention opponents warn of out-of-state money pouring into Rhode Island. But look who the biggest spenders really are leading up to Election Day. Who are the major funders of state constitutional convention referendums? The leaders of Rhode Island\u2019s coalition opposing a convention, RI Citizens for Responsible Government, report that \u201cwealthy special interests,\u201d including \u201cout-of-state\u201d and […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"on","_et_pb_old_content":"\n

Constitutional convention opponents warn of out-of-state money pouring into Rhode Island. But look who the biggest spenders really are leading up to Election Day.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Who are the major funders of state constitutional convention referendums? The leaders of Rhode Island\u2019s coalition opposing a convention, RI Citizens for Responsible Government<\/a>, report that \u201cwealthy special interests,\u201d including \u201cout-of-state\u201d and \u201cdark money\u201d interests, support convention referendums. However, the evidence shows the opposite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rhode Island\u2019s \u201cno\u201d coalition does make some valid general observations about funding for ballot measures: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

1) The wealthy can spend unlimited amounts of money on referendums (but they have been allowed to since 1978, not 2010, as the \u201cno\u201d coalition claims.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2) Large amounts of money have been spent trying to influence referendums.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3) Money can influence referendum results.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But when the coalition compares \u201cno\u201d and \u201cyes\u201d campaigns, it gets its facts backward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cNo\u201d campaigns far outspend \u201cyes\u201d campaigns. In fact, \u201cno\u201d campaigns are backed by the most powerful special interest groups in each state. And \u201cno\u201d campaigns are also backed by out-of-state interests \u2014 mostly national organizations supporting their state affiliates. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Consider Alaska in 2022<\/a>, the last election cycle with a convention referendum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u201cno\u201d side raised $4.8 million, the \u201cyes\u201d side $61,600, for a 78:1 advantage for the \u201cyes\u201d side. Since political science demonstrates that a ballot measure campaign dollar spent defending the status quo is much more effective than one spent proposing change, the 78:1 nominal advantage greatly underestimates the effective advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On a per capita basis, the \u201cno\u201d campaign was the most expensive \u201cno\u201d campaign among all the 140 ballot measures across the U.S. On a per capita basis, it also had the largest amount of out-of-state and dark money.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a>
 What Question 1 will look like on the Nov. 5, 2024, ballot. (Rhode Island Secretary of State Voter Guide)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The combined out-of-state and dark money represented 67.4% of the total \u201cno\u201d spending and all came from the D.C.-based Sixteen Thirty Fund<\/a>, which is run by a former National Education Association political operative<\/a>. The in-state money predominantly came from local unions, especially unions representing government employees. For the \u201cyes\u201d campaign, the money predominantly came from individuals, with the largest \u201cyes\u201d contribution ($10,000) only 0.002 times the size of the largest \u201cno\u201d contribution ($3.2 million). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Rhode Island in 2014, the last time the convention referendum was on the ballot, the \u201cno\u201d side contributed $151,800 and the \u201cyes\u201d side $41,500, a 3.7 advantage. As in Alaska, the predominant \u201cno\u201d funders and organizers were unions and the predominant \u201cyes\u201d funders were individuals. Rhode Island hasn\u2019t had an Alaska-style dark money problem; it has primarily had a disclosure enforcement problem<\/a> \u2014 a campaign finance system that favors the wealthy and powerful over everyone else who, for example, cannot afford the high legal costs required to enforce the law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As of Oct. 16, 2024, the \u201cno\u201d coalition had raised $119,700 for campaign advertising, including $15,000<\/a> from the out-of-state National Education Association, according to campaign finance reports filed with the Rhode Island Board of Elections. No \u201cyes\u201d campaign currently exists. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A major difference between the \u201cno\u201d and \u201cyes\u201d sides concerns the leadup to a referendum when polls indicate the \u201cyes\u201d side might win. Here the \u201cno\u201d side seems to be able to spend whatever it takes to secure a win whereas the \u201cyes\u201d side cannot. This may be because unions, such as the National Education Association, keep a large fund to provide its local affiliates with support in such a situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cNo\u201d campaigns far outspend \u201cyes\u201d campaigns. In fact, \u201cno\u2019 campaigns are backed by the most powerful special interest groups in each state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What explains the imbalance in campaign finance between the \u201cyes\u201d and \u201cno\u201d campaigns? One explanation involves the democratic function of the convention process, which, like the ballot initiative (which Rhode Island lacks), is to bypass the legislature\u2019s monopoly gatekeeping power. This makes not only legislatures but the special interest groups that excel at influencing legislatures into the natural enemies of the convention process. A second explanation is that improving government infrastructure \u2014 the core function of the convention process \u2014 is a quintessentially public good, so suffers from severe collective action problems. An analogy is the different collective action problems faced by producers (e.g., airlines) vs. consumers (e.g., passengers); the former are well organized and funded, the latter not so. Similarly, \u201cno\u201d sides are better funded and organized than \u201cyes\u201d sides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From the late 19th to early 20th centuries, big business primarily organized \u201cno\u201d campaigns. Beginning in the late 20th century, it became big labor. Big business still plays a major role opposing conventions in Republican states; much less so in Democratic ones such as Rhode Island.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To really understand who would benefit from a convention, look no farther than who funds and orchestrates \u2018no\u201d campaigns. Claims inconsistent with this funding data are Machiavellian politics. After the 2004 referendum, the Providence Journal\u2019s editorial page editor Edward Achorn convincingly argued<\/a> the \u201cno\u201d campaign not only successfully hid its funding but did so because timely revealing it could have caused it to lose the close election<\/a>. His insights are as relevant today as they were then.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

#<\/p>\n\n\n\n

J.H. Snider is the editor of The Rhode Island State Constitutional Convention Clearinghouse and author of the video, \"Question 1 \u2013 Constitutional Convention.\"<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Source: <\/strong>Snider,\u00a0 J.H.,\u00a0Following the money on Question 1<\/a>, Rhode Island Current, Oct. 17, 2024.<\/p>\n","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2596","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-blog"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rhodeisland.concon.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2596","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rhodeisland.concon.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rhodeisland.concon.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rhodeisland.concon.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rhodeisland.concon.info\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=2596"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/rhodeisland.concon.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2596\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2861,"href":"https:\/\/rhodeisland.concon.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2596\/revisions\/2861"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rhodeisland.concon.info\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=2596"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rhodeisland.concon.info\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=2596"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rhodeisland.concon.info\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=2596"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}